Abstract: This paper presents a heuristic attack on the fully homomorphic encryption over the integers by using lattice reduction algorithm. Our result shows that the FHE in [DGHV10] is not secure for some parameter settings. We also present an improvement scheme to avoid the lattice attack in this paper.
Introduction
Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] introduced a notion of privacy homomorphism. But until 2009, Gentry [Gen09] constructed the first fully homomorphic encryptions based on ideal lattice, all previous schemes are insecure. Following the breakthrough of [Gen09] , there is currently great interest on fully-homomorphic encryption [SV10, vDGHV10, SS10, GH11a, GH11b, BV11a, BV11b, BGV11, CJMNT11, CMNT11]. In these schemes, the simplest one is certainly the one of van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [DGHV10] . The public key of this scheme is a list of approximate multiples { To conveniently compare, we simply describe the known attacks considering in the Section 5 and appendix B in [DGHV10] . Section 5 in [DGHV10] x r p − = , which also paid close attention to how to solve for the r . They considered a lattice as follows. 1 1 Our Contribution. Our main observation is that one can directly obtain the plaintext from a ciphertext and the public key without using the secret key for some parameter settings of the FHE in [DGHV10] . The attack in this paper is different from the known attacks considering in [DGHV10] . Because our method is how to recover the plaintext from a ciphertext, whereas the attacks they considered is how to solve the secret key in the scheme. So, our result shows that the FHE in [DGHV10] is not secure for some practical parameters. Organization of This Paper. Section 2 gives some notations and definitions, and the lattice reduction algorithms. Section 3 constructs a new lattice based on the public key, and presents a polynomial time algorithm to directly obtain plaintext from ciphertext. Section 4 presents an improvement scheme. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this paper, we follow the parameter setting of [DGHV10] . Let 
Lattice Reduction Algorithm
Given a basis of the lattice , one of the most famous problems of the algorithm theory of lattices is to find a short nonzero vector. Currently, there is no polynomial time algorithm for solving a shortest nonzero vector in a given lattice. 
L, where k β is another lattice constant using in Schnorr's analysis of his algorithm.
Shnorr [Sch87] showed that , and Ajtai improved this bound to . Asymptotically it satisfies . In particular, for all
Observation 2.3 (NS06). For lattice
, the first vector output by LLL is satisfied to the
Attack on FHE Scheme
To describe simplicity, we first refer the FHE scheme in [DGHV10] , then construct a new lattice based on the public key and recover the plaintext bit from a ciphertext by applying LLL lattice reduction algorithm.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
KeyGen( λ ). The secret key is a random odd η -bit integer: 
To implement fully homomorphic encryption scheme, one applies to it the standard Gentry's bootstappable technique.
Lattice Attack Based on the Public Key
Given a list of approximate multiples of p :
Dijk et al. [DGHV10] showed that the security of their FHE scheme is equivalent to solving the approximate GCD problem. 
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According to FHE, we know that an arbitrary ciphertext has general form .
The ideal of our attack is very simple, that is, one is how to remove in a ciphertext by adding small noise value. When completing this, it is easy to recover the plaintext bit in . To do this, we, we define following Diophantine inequality equation problem. 
On the one hand, the size of the shortest vector of lattice is less than (
Computational Experiment
In the appendix, we present a toy example to show that our attack method is how to work.
Improvement
The reason the above lattice attack is successful is that the secret key p is a large integer. If we replace p by a matrix, then the above attack dose not work.
Construction
Key Generating Algorithm (KeyGen):
(1) Select a random matrix It is not difficult to verify that the above scheme is a somewhat homomorphic encryption. Now, one can use Gentry's standard bootstrappable technique to implement fully homomorphic encryption.
In addition, we can choose two random primes . We observe that the security of this modification depends on the hardness of factoring n pq = .
Efficiency and Security.
Efficiency: The size of the public key is The above improvement scheme has more efficient, but we currently can not reduce its security to solving the secret key.
Conclusion
This paper presents a heuristic attack for the FHE in [DGHV10] by directly calling LLL algorithm. Our method concentrates on recovering the plaintext in a ciphertext, whereas the attacks considering in [DGHV10] mainly discussed how to avoid to recovering the secret key. Moreover, our attack applies the average-case performance of lattice reduction algorithm, whereas the security of their scheme depends upon the worst-case performance of lattice reduction algorithm. Our result shows that the FHE scheme in [DGHV10] is not secure for some parameter settings. According to our experiment, one can avoid the above lattice attack by setting parameter 6 γ λ = . But, the scheme is less practical in this case.
In addition, we also design an improvement scheme to avoid the above lattice attack. 
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Appendix
Here we present a toy example to show the attack processing in this paper. The above three matrices is satisfied to equality U*C=B. Moreover, U is equal to B except for the first column. 
